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ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE
ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCEPTION TO THE STATE'S WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act expressly waives immunity
"for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of [a
governmental] employee" but makes an exception "if the injury
arises out of . • . [an] assault [or] battery," among other things.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(b) (Supp. 1985).
The trial court held that the plaintiff's allegation that a
University of Utah employee "assaulted and struck" her came within
the assault and battery exception to the statutory waiver of
immunity and therefore granted the defendants' motion for judgment
on the pleadings.
In her opening brief, the plaintiff, Clare Wright, first
argued that the assault and battery exception to the statutory
waiver of immunity did not apply because her injuries did not
"arise out of" an assault or battery but out of the University's
negligent hiring and supervision of the employee who struck her.
Wright agrees that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ledfors v.
Emerv

County

School

District.

effectively rejected this argument*

849

P.2d

1162

(Utah

1993),

££. Doe v. Durtschi. 716 P.2d

1238, 1243-45 (Idaho 1986) (contra). Nevertheless, the assault and
battery exception does not apply for other reasons.

1

A.

The Assault and Battery Exception Applies Only to Assaults and
Batteries Committed in the Course of Governmental Activity,
Wright also argued that, in keeping with the principle that

exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of immunity
should be narrowly construed, the terms "assault" and "battery"
should be construed to refer only to assaults and batteries
committed

in

the

course

of

law

enforcement

or

other

core

governmental activities and not, as in this case, an attack by a
noneducational employee at a public university.

The defendants

gloss over this argument by saying that the legislature has
declared

that

anything

a

governmental

entity

does

is

a

"governmental function," see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (a) , so any
assault or battery by a governmental entity or its employee by
definition is an assault or battery in the course of a governmental
activity.
The

legislature

cannot

constitutionally

cloak

every

governmental entity with absolute immunity for everything it does—
even

those

actions

completely

lacking

any

governmental

justification—simply by defining everything a governmental entity
does as a "governmental function." There are constitutional limits
on the legislature's ability to extend governmental immunity to all
actions of all governmental entities.

See, e.g.f Hansen v. Salt

Lake Countyf 794 P.2d 838, 845 (Utah 1990) (recognizing possible
constitutional problems with the grant of absolute immunity for
flood control activities); Condemarin v. University Hosp. , 775 P. 2d
- 2 -

348, 366 (Utah 1989) (holding unconstitutional the recovery limits
of the Governmental Immunity Act as applied to the University
Hospital).1

For example, the legislature could not open a public

restaurant in competition with other restaurants and immunize it
from all liability simply by adopting the syllogism the defendants
suggest: Governments are immune from liability for the exercise of
a governmental function; everything a government does (including
running a restaurant)

is a governmental

function; therefore,

governments are immune from liability for running a restaurant.
But

regardless

of

whether

the

legislature

could

constitutionally declare everything a governmental entity does a
"governmental function,11 the issue here is not the definition of
w

governmental function* in section 63-30-2 but the definitions of

••assault" and
definitions

of

"battery"
"assault"

in section
and

63-30-10.

"battery"

depend

The statutory
on

what

the

legislature intended by the terms when it passed the Governmental
Immunity Act in 1965,2 not what the legislature intended by the
term "governmental function" when it amended the act in 1987. Cf.
United States v. Neustadt. 366 U.S. 696, 707 (1961) (the law to be

1

The legislature apparently recognized the limitations on
its authority to extend immunity to all conduct of a governmental
entity when, in the wake of Condemarin, it amended section 63-30-3
to define only certain operations of state-owned university
hospitals as "governmental functions."
See Utah Code Ann. S
63-30-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
2

The assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity
has not changed in substance since it was originally enacted.

3

applied in construing the assault and battery exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity is the law according
to "established tort definitions . . . in 1946 ,M when the FTCA was
adopted).
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of
its makers
This is not the substitution of the
will of the judge for that of the legislator; for
frequently words of general meaning are used in a
statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question, and yet a consideration of the whole
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act. . . . " . . . [T]he sages of
the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary
to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes
which comprehend all things in the letter they have
expounded to extend to but some things, . . . which
expositions have always been founded upon the intent of
the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by
considering the cause and necessity of making the act,
sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another,
and sometimes by foreign circumstances.11
Rector of the Holv Trinity Church v. United States. 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892) (quoting Stradlina v. Morgan. Plow. 205).
The Governmental Immunity Act as originally enacted provided
for governmental immunity for the exercise of a governmental
function but waived immunity, if there ever was any, for the
exercise of nongovernmental functions. See Utah Code Ann. S 63-303

(1977); Johnson v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 433

(1981); Greenhalgh v. Payson Citv. 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975).
In other words, the Act was meant to retain immunity only where
- 4 -

government was acting as government; government could be liable for
its actions when they were indistinguishable from those of a
private person.

See Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-3 & -4 (1977).

After providing generally for immunity for the exercise of
governmental functions, the Act then waived that immunity for
negligent acts or omissions of governmental employees acting within
the scope of their employment, with certain exceptions. See id. §
63-30-10.
This waiver of immunity would have been unnecessary if the
negligent act of the governmental entity or its agent did not
constitute the exercise of a governmental function in the first
place, since the Act did not provide immunity for such acts. When
the legislature then made an exception to its waiver of immunity
for injuries arising out of an assault or battery, it must have had
in mind only assaults and batteries occurring in the course of
governmental functions, since only such actions were subject to the
statutory waiver of immunity in the first place.

C£. Sheridan v.

United States. 487 U.S. 392, 400 (1988) (the assault and battery
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to torts
that fall outside the act's general waiver of immunity) (adopting
the reasoning of Judge (later Justice) Harlan in Panella v. United
States. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954)).
Consistent with the structure of the Governmental Immunity Act
and its legislative history and intent, "assault11 and "battery11 in
section 63-30-10 should be construed to refer to assaults committed
• 5 -

in the course of law enforcement or other core governmental
activities and not simply any assault committed by any government
employee. See Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 350
(Utah 1989) (each of section 63-30-10's exceptions to its waiver of
immunity is "within the %core' of governmental functions'*).

Cf.

Ricca v. United States. 488 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(the assault and battery exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
is essentially an exception for claims based on failure to follow
proper police procedure).
B.

There Was No Assault or Battery in This Case,
In any event, the assault and battery exception to the Act's

waiver of immunity does not apply here because there was no
"assaultM or "battery."
Assault and battery require intentional conduct.

Lively v.

City of Blackfoot, 416 P.2d 27, 31 (Idaho 1966); Stricklin v.
Parsons Stockyard Co.. 388 P.2d 824, 829 (Kan. 1964).

See also W.

Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 9 at
39 & S 10 at 46 (5th ed. 1984) (assault requires proof that the
actor intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact or to arouse
apprehension of such a contact) • Where there is no intent to cause
harm, there is no assault or battery.

See, e.g.. Bollaert v.

Witter. 792 P.2d 465, 466 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Morgan v. Pistone.
25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839, 839-40 (1970) (where the defendant
touched

the plaintiff

fl

simply

to

call

attention

by way

of

explanation that he,f did not like the plaintiff's insults, there
- 6 -

was not necessarily "that kind of intentional touching amounting to
a technical battery").

The facts# viewed in the light most

favorable to Wright# show that the employee who struck her was
autistic and was in a trance at the time he struck her.

One can

infer from this that he lacked the intent to harm Wright or cause
her apprehension.

Thus, there was no assault or battery.

The defendants argue, however, that, when it comes to tort
liability,
standard.

a mentally

ill person

is judged

by an objective

Because a mentally ill person can still be liable for

his torts, the defendants claim, the assault exception applies.
The defendants' argument is a nonsequitur.

The issue here is not

whether the employee who struck Wright can be civilly liable for
the damage he caused but whether Wright's injuries arise out of an
••assault" and "battery" within the meaning of section 63-3010(1)(b). If the employee lacked the requisite intent to commit an
assault, Wright's injuries do not "arisef] out of" an assault or
battery, regardless of whether the employee may nevertheless be
liable civilly for the harm he caused.
As the defendants note, the cases holding mentally ill people
liable for their attacks on others generally rest, not on a
traditional tort analysis

(that is, on the grounds that the

defendant's actions meet all the elements of a claim for assault or
battery) but on grounds of public policy.

The principal policy

underlying those decisions is that, where one of two innocent
persons must suffer a loss, the loss should fall on the one who
- 7 -

caused it rather than the other, who had no role in producing it
and could not have avoided it. That policy supports Wright's claim
in this case.
avoided it.

Wright did not cause her loss and could not have

The University caused her loss (or at least made it

likely to occur) by hiring an autistic person with a known
propensity for violence and placing him in a position where he was
likely to come in contact with students. As between Wright and the
University, the University should bear the loss.

By giving the

terms "assault11 and "battery" their ordinary meanings, the court
can see that the University bears the loss caused by its employee's
actions.
A second policy underlying the decisions holding mentally ill
people liable for their acts is that such a result will encourage
the custodians of the mentally ill to restrain them from injuring
others.

Like a custodian, the University, as the employer of the

person who assaulted the plaintiff, had a duty to see that the
employee's actions did not harm others.

If the University is

immunized from liability for its breach of that duty, it will have
no incentive to exercise more care in the future when it hires and
supervises the mentally ill. Thus, public policy actually favors
a finding of liability in this case.3
3

A third policy underlying the liability of mentally ill
people is the difficulty of determining mental deficiency and a
hesitancy to introduce into the civil law the confusion surrounding
proof of insanity in criminal cases. However, these concerns do
not justify denying recovery in a proper case. The threshold
question in a case such this is whether or not there was an assault
- 8 -

If the employee lacked the requisite intent to commit an
assault or battery, by definition there was no assault or battery#
and the assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity
does not apply.4

S§& Moffjtt yt United gfrafreg, 430 F. Supp. 34,

37-38 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
C.

Tfre Plaintiff#P
Conclusion-

gpmplaint

Poes $o% Fequjre

a Pifferept

The defendants suggest, however# that because Wright alleged
that she was "assaulted?and struck" by a University employee, she
was somehow bound by her characterization of the attack and the
trial court was therefore justified in dismissing her claim.5
or battery. That issue would be the same whether the plaintiff
sued her assailant directly or sued his employer. Triers of fact
are quite capable of determining issues of intent and determining
whether or not the actor had the requisite intent for an
intentional tort. See, e.g., Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475
P.2d 839, 839-40 (1970) (jury did not err in finding that there was
not an intentional touching amounting to a battery). If the actor
had the requisite intent, he may have committed an assault or
battery, but if he did not, there is no tort, and hence the
intentional tort exception does not apply. If this is a question
of making "hairsplitting distinction[s],w as the defendants claim,
as the defendants also recognize, it is a distinction that courts,
juries and even dogs are quite capable of making and in fact make
every day.
4

In that case, the University's liability would be analogous
to that of a person who assumes control over a vicious animal or an
explosive device. See Sheridan v. United States. 487 U.S. 392, 403
(1988).
5

The defendants further argue that the trial court committed
no error in not allowing Wright to amend her complaint to allege an
unintentional striking because Wright had ample time to amend and
did not do so. Wright did not amend her complaint because she did
not think any amendment was necessary. The trial court could only
grant the defendants' motion if Wright would not have been entitled
to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support
- 9

Wright's use of the word "assaulted" is not conclusive.

In

determining the applicability of the assault and battery exception
to the waiver of immunity, "a court must look, not to the theory
upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the
substance of the claim which he asserts."

Lambertson v. United

States, 528 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 921
(1976).

Wright's complaint alleges that she was "assaulted and

struck." R. at 3 I 4 (emphasis added). While one could infer from
the word "assaulted" that the employee who hit Wright had the
requisite intent for an assault, the word
necessarily

connote

a

battery.

intentional

or unintentional.

A
An

"struck" does not

striking

intentional

can

be

striking

either
is a

battery, but an unintentional striking is not. See, e.g., Moffitt,
430 F. Supp. at 37-38.
vice versa.

Not all assaults include batteries, and

See Baca v. VelezP 833 P.2d 1194, 1196 (N.M. Ct.

App.), cert, denied. 835 P.2d 80 (N.M. 1992).
without the other."

"One may exist

W. Page Keeton, et al., supraf § 10 at 46.

of her claim. See, e.g.. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.f 795 P.2d
622, 624 (Utah 1990). Wright offered one set of facts that would
have entitled her to relief—an unintentional striking by a person
in an autistic trance. The burden was therefore on the defendants
to show that the employee who struck Wright acted with the
requisite mental state for commission of an assault or battery.
See Ricca v. United States. 488 F. Supp. 1317f 1324-25 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) . See also Moff itt. 430 F. Supp. at 38 (where the plaintiffs
contended in their brief that there was a question of fact
concerning the government employee's mental condition, that factual
issue had to be resolved before the court could determine whether
the assault exception applied). The defendants have never even
tried to meet that burden.
• 10

Wright did not allege that the employee committed an assault and
battery.

She alleged that the employee assaulted and struck her.

Wright's injuries arose from having been struck, not assaulted.
Wright's allegation that she was •,struck[]w by the University
employee was broad enough to cover an unintentional striking for
which the assault and battery exception of section 63-30-10(1)(b)
would not apply.

£f. Ricca. 488 F. Supp. at 1321, 1323-24 (where

the plaintiff claimed that the defendants "assaulted, harassed,
aimed at and shot11 her, the government was entitled to summary
judgment on her specific cause of action for assault and battery
but not on her negligence claim, since the assault and battery
could have been unintentional).
Because there was at least one state of facts under which the
plaintiff would have been entitled to relief against the defendants
despite the assault and battery exception to the Governmental
Immunity

Act's

waiver

of

immunity—namely,

an

unintentional

striking by a University employee acting within the scope of his
employment—the defendants were not entitled to judgment on the
pleadings, and the trial court erred in granting their motion.

II.
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The plaintiff has argued that, if the Governmental Immunity
Act bars her claims, the Act is unconstitutional.

11 -

The defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that the
Governmental Immunity Act did not unconstitutionally deprive the
plaintiff of any remedy against the state because the state was
absolutely immune from tort liability at common law, regardless of
whether the activity in question was characterized as "proprietary"
or a "governmental function."
In fact, in determining whether the state or its related
entities enjoy governmental immunity in a given case, Utah courts
have considered whether

or not the activities

involved were

governmental functions. See, e.g.. Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co,,
842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (Utah Department of Transportation);
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst. . 782 P.2d 506, 512 (Utah 1989)
(state and department of financial institutions); Condemarin v.
University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 349-50 & 372 (Utah 1989) (per
Durham & Stewart, JJ.) (University Hospital); Little v. Utah State
Div. of Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) (state division
of family services); White v. State. 579 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Utah
1978) (state industrial commission); Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah
2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 368 (1968) (state and state prison warden);
Campbell Blda. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857,
860 (1937) (road commission); Kirk v. State. 784 P.2d 1255, 1256
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (state and department of corrections).

See

also Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist.. 20 Utah
2d 389, 438 P.2d 706, 707 (1968) ("This court consistently, since
statehood, has noted the distinction" between governmental and
- 12 -

proprietary functions); Cobia v. Rov Citv, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d
986, 988 (1961) (MOur court consistently has held [state] agencies
. . • immune from tort liability where such agency has acted in a
governmental

capacity

rather

than

in

a

proprietary

one").

Moreover, Utah cases have recognized that the immunity of the state
and its subdivisions derives from the fact that the functions the
state generally performs are governmental, not proprietary, in
nature.

See, e.g., Hurst v. Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153,

397 P.2d 71, 73 (1964) ;.' Bingham v. Board of Educ, 118 Utah 582,
223 P.2d 432, 436-38 (1950).
The great weight of authority from other jurisdictions has
also

recognized

the

distinction

between

proprietary

and

governmental functions in determining the liability of states and
their subdivisions and has not reserved the distinction only for
municipal corporations. See Annotation, State's Immunity from Tort
Liability as Dependent on Governmental or Proprietary Nature of
Function. 40 A.L.R.2d 927 S 2 (1955), and cases cited therein.
In any event, the argument is properly directed to the Utah
Supreme Court.

In Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348

(Utah 1989), that court held that the Governmental Immunity Act's
limitation on damage awards was unconstitutional as applied to an
injured party's claim against the University Hospital because it
deprived the plaintiff of a right she would have had at common law,
namely, the right to sue an agency of the state (the university
hospital) for negligence in the performance of nongovernmental
- 13 -

functions.
state could

Thus, a majority of the court apparently thought the
be sued

at common

nongovernmental function.
371-72

(Stewart,

J.). 6

law

if

it was performing a

See 775 P.2d at 349-52 (Durham, J.) &
The

defendants

have

not

tried

to

distinguish Condemarin: they have only argued that it was wrongly
decided. But until the Utah Supreme Court overrules Condemarin, it
is still good law and is dispositive of the defendants' argument
that Wright has not been deprived of any right in violation of the
open courts provision because the state was absolutely immune from
tort liability at common law and the proprietary-governmental
function distinction does not apply to the state.
The defendants further argue that, even if the state was only
immune from liability at common law when it was exercising a
governmental function, higher education is such a function.

All

the cases the defendants have cited in support of this argument are
inapposite because they involved the liability of public high
schools or junior high schools, not a public university, as in this

6

The third justice in the majority, Justice Zimmerman,
tacitly agreed that individuals could sue the state at common law
for injuries arising out of the performance of nongovernmental
functions. Although he did not specifically address the scope of
the state's immunity at common law, he agreed that the Governmental
Immunity Act impinged on important substantive rights protected by
article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See 775 P.2d at
367-68. If the state were absolutely immune from liability at
common law, as the defendants claim, it would not violate the open
courts provision to limit a plaintiff's remedy against the state.
See Madsen v. BorthicR, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983).
- 14 -

case.7

The state does not require people to attend universities,

as it does elementary and secondary schools.

££. Hamburger v.

Cprn?U VTUversity, 172 N.Y.S. 5, 6 (N.Y. A P P . Div. 1918) (a
university does not discharge a governmental function), aff'd, 123
N.E. 868 (N.Y. 1919).
More important, cases applying the governmental-proprietary
distinction to schools have looked at the particular activity
giving rise to the claim to determine whether or not the conduct
was governmental in nature and hence whether immunity applies.
£g£, e.g.. Meyerhoffer v. East Hanover Township Sch. Dist.. 280 F.
Supp. 81, 83-84 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Sawaya v. Tucson High Sch. Dist.
No. 1. 281 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz. 1955); Brown v. Wichita State Univ.
f"Brown I") . 540 P.2d 66, 87-88 (Kan. 1975), modified, 547 P.2d
1015 ("Brown II*) (Kan.), appeal dismissed. 429 U.S. 806 (1976);8
7

One of the cases the defendants rely on for their argument
that higher education is a governmental function is Bingham v.
Board of Education. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950). The
plaintiff in Bingham was injured when she fell into burning embers
from a school incinerator. The state has also relied on Bingham
for its argument that the governmental-proprietary function
distinction does not apply to the state and its agencies. In
another appeal the state has argued that, because the school
board's operation of an incinerator to burn books and other debris
was clearly a proprietary and not a governmental function, if the
distinction applied to the state, then the school board would have
been held liable in Bingham. Brief of Intervener State of Utah at
4-5, Hipwell v. Sharp (Utah) (No. 920218). As the state candidly
recognized in that case, not everything a school board (or
university) does is a governmental function.
8

Brown I held that Kansas's governmental immunity statute,
which gave the state absolute immunity but made other governmental
entities immune only for the performance of governmental functions,
violated equal protection, due process and the state constitution's
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Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21, 28 (Kan. 1969); Allen v. Salina
Broadcasting. Inc.. 630 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

The

mere identity of the defendant as a public school or university is
not dispositive.

See Brown I. 540 P.2d at 88 (the liability of a

governmental entity ••will depend upon the particular activity with
due consideration given to the totality of all relevant factors").
As the defendants recognize,9 there is no evidence of record
to show how the employee who struck the plaintiff was engaged at
the time of the incident.

Thus, the trial court could not say,

based solely on the pleadings, that the employee was engaged in the
performance of a governmental function at the time.

There was at

least one state of facts under which the plaintiff would have been
entitled to relief—namely, if the University employee was not
engaged in the performance of a governmental function.

Where, as

here, there is a genuine issue of fact as to the specific activity
giving rise to the plaintiff's claim, the defendants are not
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

See Allen, 630 S.W.2d

at 228 (where there was a material issue of fact as to whether a
school district was engaged in a proprietary or governmental

open courts provision.
On rehearing, the court reversed its
conclusion on the constitutional issue and vacated that part of its
decision. See Brown IIf 547 P.2d at 1019.
9

See Brief of Appellees at 27.
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function when it allegedly defamed the plaintiff# the district was
not entitled to summary judgment).
Even if the Governmental Immunity Act did not deprive Wright
of a right she would have had at common law to sue the state, the
1978 amendment to section 63-30-4 of the Act, which extended
immunity to government employees, deprived Wright of a right she
clearly would have had at common law to sue her assailant. The Act
did not provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy to
a civil action against the government employee who caused her
injury, nor was the abrogation of individual liability justified as
a reasonable means of eliminating a clear social or economic evil.
Thus, the Act violates the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution, article I, section 11.

See Berry v. Beech Aircraft

Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
The defendants argue, however, that the plaintiff's open
courts challenge fails because she failed to establish that she has
no remedy for her injuries against the employee who struck her.
Section 63-30-4(3) of the Governmental Immunity Act expressly
extends the immunity

accorded governmental

entities to their

employees unless the employee acted through fraud or malice.

The

defendants argue that Judge Lewis did not err in rejecting the
plaintiff's open courts challenge because "there is at least the
possibility that Wright can prove that the employee acted with
malice.11

Brief of Appellees at 28.

w

By the same token, there is

at least the possibility" that the employee did not act with
- 17 -

malice, in which case he would be immune from liability.

In fact,

if the employee could not form the intent required for an assault
or battery, as Wright claims, a fortiori he did not act with
malice. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court
was required to consider this latter possibility.10
Because the defendants were entitled to judgment on the
pleadings only if there was no state of facts under which Wright
would be entitled to relief and, by the defendants' own reasoning,
there was at least one state of facts under which Wright would have
been deprived of a remedy against her assailant, in violation of
the open courts provision, the trial court erred in granting the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Finally, the defendants argue that, because Wright has not
proved that she has been deprived of any right protected by the
open courts clause, a presumption of constitutionality applies, and
the challenged provisions easily meet the minimum scrutiny required
under the due process and equal protection clauses.
For the reasons stated above, Wright has been deprived of
rights

protected

by

the

open

courts provision

10

of

the Utah

The defendants also suggest that the plaintiff might also
have a remedy against the state under the Crime Victim's
Reparations Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63-1 through -24. However,
reparation awards may be made only for "criminally injurious
conduct,11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-63-11(9) (a), which the act defines as
conduct that would be punishable under the criminal code, id..
§ 63-63-2(6)(a). If the mental state of the employee who struck
the plaintiff precluded him from intending his actions or their
consequences, he would not be subject to punishment under the Utah
Criminal Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-101 & -305(1).
- 18 -

Constitution, article I, section ll.11

Thus, the burden was on

the defendants to show that the Governmental Immunity Act was
constitutional.
burden.

The defendants have not even tried to meet that

But if the burden were on Wright to prove the Act

unconstitutional, she has met her burden.
The heightened scrutiny Condemarin applied to the recovery
limits provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act was not based
solely on the deprivation of a common law right in violation of the
open courts provision.
legislature is

As Justice Durham noted, deference to the

,f

inappropriate when dealing with the fundamental

principle of American law that victims of wrongful or negligent
acts should be compensated to the extent that they have been
harmed.H

Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 354.

See also id. at 360 ("the

right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive
rightw). Under the Utah Supreme Court's equal protection analysis,
the strictness of the court's scrutiny varies with the nature of
the right or interest discriminated against.

See id. at 372 (per

Stewart, J.) (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n.17 (Utah
1984)). See also Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp, .
752 P.2d 884, 889

(Utah 1988) (wto pass state constitutional

muster, a legislative measure must often meet a higher de facto
standard of reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal

11

At a minimum, Wright's complaint raises genuine factual
issues as to whether Wright has been deprived of such rights,
making judgment on the pleadings inappropriate.
• 19

courts"). And under the court's wmore straightforward11 due process
analysis, the court looks at the reasonableness of legislative
action in relation to legitimate legislative ends. See Condemarin.
775 P.2d at 356-57 (per Durham, J.). Given the importance of the
rights involved in this case, a higher standard of review is
required whether the court analyzes the Governmental Immunity Act
under due process or equal protection, and under any but the most
deferential scrutiny, the Act fails.
By arbitrarily depriving certain classes of injured people of
any right to recovery—such as victims of governmental as opposed
to nongovernmental torts, victims of the state as opposed to
victims of other governmental entities, students of public as
opposed to private universities, victims of governmental assaults
as opposed to governmental negligence, and those injured in their
persons as opposed to those injured

in their

property12—the

Governmental Immunity Act violates the equal protection guaranty of
the Utah Constitution:
The doctrine [of governmental immunity] and the
exceptions thereto, operate in such an illogical manner
as to result in serious inequality. Liability is the
rule for negligent or tortious conduct, immunity is the
exception. But when the tortfeasor is a governmental
agency, immunized from liability, the injured person must
forego his right to redress unless within a specific
12

As applied by the trial court, the Governmental Immunity
Act affords greater protection to property than to people—the
source of the state's power—since the state cannot take private
property for public use without paying just compensation, see Utah
Const, art. I, § 22, yet it can intentionally ruin a person's
health and even take her life with impunity.
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exception.
Equality is not achieved by artificial
exceptions which indiscriminately grant some injured
persons recourse in the courts and arbitrarily deny such
relief to others. The operative effect of such arbitrary
distinctions are incompatible with the constitutional
safeguards [of equal protection] . . . .
Brown I, 540 P.2d at 81-82 (citations omitted).
The

Governmental

Immunity

Act#

as

interpreted

by

defendants and the trial court, also violates due process.
deprives the plaintiff of any redress for her injuries.

the
It
The

defendants offer no justification for this limitation on an injured
person's rights and well—being, and the traditional justifications
offered for governmental immunity simply do not hold water.
The rationale most often given for governmental immunity is
the need to protect the public treasury.
P.2d at 1027.

M

The error of this rationale lies in the speculation

from which it is borne.11
Supreme

Court

See, e.g., Brown II, 547

has

already

Brown 1 . 540 P.2d at 83.
concluded

that

this

The Utah

rationale

is

insufficient to deprive an injured person of any remedy for her
injuries, especially where, as here, the state has offered no
evidence to suggest that the public treasury is in any danger. See
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363 (Durham, J.), 369 (Zimmerman, J.) &
373-74 (Stewart, J.).

gee also Brown II, 547 P.2d at 1037-38

(Fatzer, C.J., dissenting); Brown I. 540 P.2d at 83; John W. Creer,
Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act:

An Analysis. 1967 Utah

L. Rev. 120, 122 & n.13; and authorities cited therein (the
experience of those jurisdictions that have abrogated governmental
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immunity dispels the myth that the removal of immunity will lead to
the state's financial ruin).
A second rationale sometimes offered for governmental immunity
is that immunity is necessary to allow government to function
unhampered

by the threat of legal action.

Of course, this

rationale loses its force where the legal claim does not arise out
of the performance of a governmental function.

Moreover, the

possibility of spurious lawsuits does not justify the denial of
meritorious claims:
To say that government needs to be able to operate
unhampered by the threat of legal actions intimates that
the state should not be bothered by the fact it has
injured people because it has more important things to
do.
M

. . . A government of *of, by and for
the people' derives its strength from being
just and reasonable and not irresponsible in
its dealings with the people. . . .
*To
submit, in justification of the rule, that the
immunity
is necessary
for
the
proper
functioning of [government], is to propound
the obvious contradiction that the agency
formed to protect society is under no
obligation, when active itself, to protect an
individual member of society.#M
[Blades, &
Comment on Governmental Tort Immunity in
Kansas. 16 Kan. L. Rev. 265, 267-68 (1968)].
To say that the threat of legal actions will
intolerably hamper government activities is to say that
government alone, among all our institutions, cannot
properly function if it shoulders responsibility for its
actions.
Brown II. 547 P.2d at 1038 (Fatzer, C.J., dissenting). As Abraham
Lincoln said, "It is as much the duty of government to render
proper justice against itself, in favor of its citizens, as to
• 22 -

administer the same between private individuals ." Quoted in Sawava
v. Tucson High Sch. Dist. No, 1, 281 P.2d 105, 107 (Ariz. 1955).
In short, to the extent the Governmental Immunity Act deprives
Wright of any remedy for her injuries, either from her assailant or
from the university that negligently hired and failed to supervise
him, the Act violates the open courts, equal protection and due
process guaranties of the Utah Constitution.13
CONCLUSION
"A fundamental concept of our system of laws is that one may
seek redress for every substantial wrong.w
1043

(Fatzer, C.J.,

dissenting).

Brown II. 547 P.2d at

The trial court's ruling,

granting the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings,
deprived Wright of any opportunity she might otherwise have had to
obtain redress for her injuries.

For the reasons set out in

Wright's opening brief and in this reply brief, the judgment of the
district court should be reversed.

13

It is bad enough that Wright is denied any recovery from
the defendants: "To maintain a system of laws whereby we are
individually liable but collectively immune is more than
irrational, it is immoral.w Brown II. 547 P.2d at 1043 (Fatzer,
C.J., dissenting).
But, under section 63-30-4, she is also
deprived of any remedy against the government employee who
inflicted her injuries.
• 23
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